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The Moral Limits of Economics in Health Care 
 
  Everyone who has been in love or built a family knows that there are things, essential 
things, that money can’t buy. Patients with serious illness and their network of caregivers know 
this too, because those things that really matter to us are threatened and must be defended. And 
many clinicians, reflecting on what is at stake in health care not only for patients but for Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 









themselves, know the same thing: the market has an important role in health care financing and 
health systems reform, but it cannot and should not reach into those quintessentials of caregiving 
that speak to what is most deeply human in medicine and in living. This is the moral limit of an 
economic paradigm. Or at least it should be. 
 
  But we live in a truly confused age. The market model has infiltrated so thoroughly into 
human lives and medicine that in certain circles—policy making and analysis, hospital and clinic 
administration, and, to a degree that would have shocked us 50 years ago, clinical work—
economic rationality with its imperative of containing costs and maximizing efficiency has come 
to mute the moral, emotional, religious and aesthetic expressions of sufferers and caregivers. 
Most take it for granted and accept its implications. Simplistic models from economic Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 









psychology, behavioral economics and business studies, based on the narrowest calculations of 
what a ‘rational man’ (or woman) would choose as most cost effective, are now routinely applied 
to clinical decision-making and the organization of care. They model the choices available to 
patients and their family members, as if they were sufficient for the torturous experience at end-
of-life, the routine frustrating crises that constitute caregiving for neurodegenerative conditions, 
the admixture of desperation that depression brings to disabling heart disease and cancers, and 
the emotional turmoil and challenges to our values of serious childhood disabilities. Such 
models, pace the claims to the contrary of health policy experts and program administrators, are 
themselves value-laden, and once introduced, warp the context of health care—a kind of 
gravitational field that attracts the instrumental and distorts the human.  
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  Professionals and laypersons may rail against the hubris of the market model in 
caregiving, and yet in current debates over health care reform in the U.S., the U.K, China, and 
many other countries, neither the voices of clinical professionals nor those of family caregivers 
are invited or adequately heard, let alone carry equal weight. Nor do abiding concerns over social 
justice for people in deep poverty or doing good in the world for the sake of the most vulnerable  
and those in great distress seem to mobilize the power of persuasion and calling that those of us 
who came of age in the 1950s and 1960s remember. 
 
  This is not just an issue of the corrosive effect of unbridled capitalism on human values 
which Marx inveighed against, albeit it is partly that. It is also a stunning failure of people who 
have skin in the game, which means pretty nearly all of us, to adequately articulate and champion Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 









an alternative. In caregiving, I believe there is an alternative that makes the case for the limits of 
markets and also offers a different vision; because caregiving in and of itself is one of the 
foundational moral meanings and practices in human experience everywhere, defining human 
value that resists crude reduction to counting and costing.  
 
 
Caregiving as Human Value and Moral Practice 
 
  Consider how central caregiving is to what it means to be human. Caregiving is an 
indelible part of relations between partners, the raising of children, and response to the 
infirmities of aged parents and grandparents. It is, of course, the very definition of how families Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 









and friendship networks cope with sickness  or disability among their own. And there is an 
ancient lineage to caregiving across historical periods and societies. Nursing, medicine, and the 
allied health disciplines justify their status as healing professions by underlining their 
professional commitment to caregiving. Religions respond to suffering with rituals that animate 
caregiving in both social and subjective realms. All cultures have elaborate systems of healing 
and ideas about illness and its courses and treatment which are enacted in the care of the sick. Of 
course, the sensibility of caregiving extends well beyond medicine to stewardship of the 
environment, support for the welfare of the poor, and to the building of political institutions and 
processes that advance basic human interests.  
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  To be sure, the moral distance between stated values and actual practices is substantial. 
Over the last several years, when I have delivered lectures at a number of medical schools and 
health science centers, I have explained to the audience that, given how little in the way of 
financial, time-in-the-curricula, and other resources most medical schools devote to the 
principles, values and practice of caregiving, perhaps we should allow medical schools to 
remove caregiving as a goal of medical education and restrict the curriculum to technical clinical 
competence and biomedical knowledge. The response in the question and answer period is 
usually dozens of hands that go up and are followed by passionate defense of how important 
caregiving is to medicine, and I adduce to their own sense of purpose and meaning.  
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  So in light of this seeming paradox—medicine invests little in caregiving, yet it is core to 
health professionals’ motivations and identity—how should we think of caregiving? 
 
  For family members, close friends, the sufferers themselves and professionals caregiving 
turns on the amelioration of pain and suffering. Practical assistance with activities of daily 
living—feeding, bathing, ambulating, toileting—is a basic component, as are protection and 
emotional support. For physicians, in particular, diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and 
rehabilitation can be carried out in ways that emphasize their human as well as their technical 
aspects, both of which are part of caregiving.  
  But here I wish to emphasize the moral face of caregiving. Acknowledgement of the 
personhood of  sufferers and affirmation of their condition and struggle have long been Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 









recognized as the most basic and sustaining of moral acts, whether among the friendship and kin 
network or in patient-physician and other professional relationships. The laying on of hands, 
empathic witnessing, listening to the illness narrative, providing moral solidarity through 
sustained engagement and responsibility over the course of chronicity and in the terminal 
period—all are core moral tasks in caregiving. Theorists of caregiving have also identified 
“presence”—being there, existentially, even when nothing practical can be done and hope itself 
is eclipsed—as central to the giving of care. And it is also important in care receiving, because 
caregiving is almost always a deeply interpersonal, relational practice which resonates with the 
most troubling preoccupations of both carer and sufferer about living, about self and about 
dignity. 
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  In anthropological terms, caregiving centers on a different kind of reciprocity than 
financial exchanges--albeit it can be both. It is closer to gift giving and receiving among people 
whose relationships really matter. The person receiving care shares her experience and story as a 
gift with the caregiver, in reciprocation for the practical things that need doing along with a 
sensibility akin to love. What is exchanged is the moral responsibility, emotional sensibility and 
social capital of the relationship. The exchange changes the subjectivity of the caregiver and 
carereceiver. The terms “taking care” and “caring” imply cultivation of the person and the 
relationship through practices of attending, enacting, supporting and collaborating. What is at 
stake is doing good, for others and for one self, if need be, in spite of the emotional and material 
cost. Indeed, the rewards, unvoiced or explicit, can be transformative, going to the heart of who 
we are and what we can offer, or endure. Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 










  Inasmuch as caregiving (and receiving) is carried out by individuals who themselves are 
complex and divided and who inhabit local worlds that are also plural and divided, it needs to be 
understood as a process that is affected by emotional, political and economic realities. But that 
does not mean that the market is more fundamental than caregiving. They are often entangled to 
be sure, but they are also distinctive ways of being human as well as different visions of who we 
are.   
 
  The great failure of contemporary medicine to promote caregiving as an existential 
practice and moral vision that resists reduction to the market model or the clarion call of 
efficiency has diminished professionals, patients and family caregivers alike. It has enabled a Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 









noisy and ubiquitous market to all but silence different motives, ideals, hopes and behaviors that 
must be expressed, because they are as much who we are as economic rationality. Absent 
caregiving from the political and economic discourse on health care, and nothing but institutional 
and monetary issues come to matter. Even questions of “quality” in health care become distorted. 
What counts as “evidence”, then, is an absence of presence. Caregiving with its central 
commitments to doing good to others and to oneself becomes invisible and is left out of the 
debates on policies and programs. And the result is that all of us are demeaned and the profession 
of medicine and the processes of health care are transmuted into something that is hollowed of its 
humanity and moral value. And yet throughout health organizations, in medical wards, in clinics, 
in ambulances and emergency facilities, in managers’ offices, in endless meetings, clinical 
conferences, and quality-of-life care committees are individuals for whom the calling and the Caregiving-as-Moral-Experience-Lancet-FIRST-SUBMISSION-October-10-2012.docx 









passion for caregiving is alive. They know the power of a touch, true listening, the quiet 
satisfaction of making a difference. The system is not the people (mostly) in it.  
 
  This is a call, therefore, for a serious discussion about caregiving and a reconsideration of 
its place in medical education, medical practice, and medical research, on the one side, and its 
significance for patients, families, and communities, on the other. Nor should this discussion be 
restricted to health care. Once we open the door to the democratic implications of caregiving as 
moral and political practices, so much of the rest of our world from leadership to governance and 
from domestic to foreign affairs becomes a matter not just of markets, regulations, and security 
concerns, but of how we can enact care as humankind’s shared project. 
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